NATO STO research TG.

The NATO SET-238 “Side-Attack Threat Detection Strategies, Technologies and Techniques” Research Task Group (RTG) has held its 5th meeting on 23-24 May in the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) facilities sited in Sevenoaks-Kent, London (UK). NATO SET-238 RTG objectives are to broadly identify current capability gaps in detection technologies and identify promising technologies that address detection of side-attack weapons in the context of route clearance operations. During meeting, the Research Task Group has discussed threat definition and common reference targets’ (8 different EFPs surrogates), scenarios and concealment has been agreed. Nations (GER, NLD, SWE, CAN, GBR, USA, AUS –not attended-) presented the results obtained through tests that apply specific detection technologies against Side-Attack Threat using standardized configuration. C-IED COE presented the recently completed Research project on EFPs using HME displaying its aims, phases, main milestones and final results and also made an update on EFPs threat around the world. Promising technologies on assessment are Laser Radar Scanner, 3D cameras, Polari-metric MWIR cameras, LIDAR -light detection and ranging- radar, Non-Linear Junction Detection, RF signatures, High Bandwidth Acoustic Detection and Imaging System and others. Nations are carrying out tests using same configurations (EFPs targets with same scenarios in order to understand how cutting-edge detection technologies work and performance on detection in Side-Attack Threats. In some cases, tests are part of certain national or multinational programs However, much more work is needed and more tests must be done to obtain an acceptable collection of IED data. The climate and light conditions, the hiding place, the characteristics of EFP, the location, the distances of detection of distance, the angle of shot and the capacity to obtain high resolution and discrimination are fundamental factors to increase the effectiveness in the detection. In this sense an extension of RTG activities until April 2020 has been approved by the NATO SET Panel. Finally, a homogenous and standardized data collection will be populated by nations and present promising technologies, scenarios, EFP targets and performances in detecting side-attack threats. Moreover, IED data collection will help future equipment developments or will help to focus deeper research in some technologies. .

ATIX.

ATIX 18.1; CIED COE From the 21st to the 25th of May, 2018, a new iteration of the Attack the Network Interagency Analysis and Exploitation Course (ATIX) was held at the C-IED COE facilities in Madrid, Spain. During those five days, eleven lecturers and twenty attendees from different military and law enforcement organizations (as USAREUR, EUROPOL, London Metropolitan Police, ESP Guardia Civil, ESP Cuerpo Nacional de Policia) discussed about how to operationalize the IED exploitation process, its products and analysis in order to support Attack the Networks activities by using both military and law enforcement techniques and procedures. As a result of the fruitful discussion, some challenging aspects were identified as well as the need to focus on them, in order to improve the performance of the C-IED activities that our forces carry out in different Theatres of Operations. .

BIFEC.

From 16 to 26 April 2018, the C-IED COE hosted the 2nd iteration of Basic IED Field Exploitation Course (BIFEC) for 15 Egyptian officers, within the C-IED COE premises in Hoyo de Manzanares. Being funded by the NATO Science for Peace and Security program, this course has been developed to meet the training and deployment requirements for approved NATO partners and non-NATO country members of governmental and non-governmental organizations. The course objective was to provide an overview of the execution of C-IED field exploitation. Throughout 2 weeks, the C-IED COE instructors taught the students, the basis of how to conduct a field investigation of an IED event, how to gather and assess the information coming from such an event and how to prepare the reports, for 2 purposes: to assure the immediate intelligence to a task force and to feed the judicial procedure with proper collected evidences, in order to make possible to prosecution and conviction of the perpetrators. Egypt is facing nowadays a real and high IED threat within national territory, mostly posed by the terrorist organizations linked to ISIS. By supporting Egyptian personnel to acknowledge the importance of organizing and conducting an efficient exploitation process, C-IED COE continues to contribute to the building of a strong and credible Egyptian C-IED capability. .

C-UAV SPANISH TECHNOLOGICAL SEMINAR

C-IED COE members attended the C-UAV Technological Seminar organized by the Spanish (SP) Ministry of Interior (Technological Centre for Security - Madrid) and the SP Association for Promotion of Strategic Technologies and Industries (APTIE) and held on 15th March 2018.

More than 160 attendees from the Spanish Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Civil Guard, National Police, Academia and Industry could listen several specialized briefings and discussions on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) threat with a comprehensive approach but focused in technological issues mainly as state of art, legislation, protection of critical infrastructures (PCIs), research and C-UAV solutions.

Session was split into three blocks

A) State of the art of the C-UAV technology (briefings form Academia & Industry), Governmental Research initiatives (SP MoI C-UAV C2 solution & SP MoD-CONDOR project).

B) Overview of the UAVs threat (National Centre for Protection of Critical Infrastructures, MoD, Industry)

C) Solutions and C-UAVs systems provided and implemented in Industry (HORUS X and others) and in the SP Armed Forces (AUDS) and DRONE Defender as a portable solution.

Seminar showed clear needs for a deep understanding of this cutting-edge threat and for a better coordination in implementing C-UAV solutions (portable, mounted, fixed or modular and scalable). Costs are also a pressing issue because very cheap UAVs could be needed a great investment in a C-UAV system.

To overcome a new and increasing threat as UAVs it could be used (individualized or swarming attacks) against a huge number of potential targets, civilian and military too there a need for a strong investment in innovative R&D solutions, ample and adapted to risks raised. Also urban environment adds constraints for using C-UAV systems. Much more effort is required in C-UAV.